A general theory of transition to addiction it was and a general theory of transition to addiction it is by Pier Vincenzo Piazza & Véronique Deroche-Gamonet
COMMENTARY
A general theory of transition to addiction it was and a general
theory of transition to addiction it is
Reply to the commentaries of Ahmed, Badiani, George & Koob, Kalivas & Gipson,
and Tiffany
Pier Vincenzo Piazza & Véronique Deroche-Gamonet
Received: 28 April 2014 /Accepted: 13 May 2014 /Published online: 8 June 2014
# The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Before replying to the comments to our “multi-step general
theory of transition to addiction,” we would like to thank the
authors for the time and effort they have devoted to analyze
our manuscript. These colleagues have raised some reason-
able concerns about our theory that will be addressed in a
future revised version, but we are pleased that the basic
principles of our theory continue to stand.
Our reply is divided in three sections. The first section
contains a discussion that addresses concerns that ap-
peared in several commentaries. The second and third
sections contain our reply to the criticisms that we agree
or disagree with, respectively.
A. Common criticisms; we rediscovered the wheel and it
doesn’t even works properly
Often, when one publishes something potentially in-
novative one hears two basic criticisms:
1. It is not true.
2. It is not new, typically expressed as it was
said/published before and/or everyone knows it is a
known fact.
In the case of our theory, these two criticisms are the
common denominators of all of the commentaries we
received. “It is not true, this is not a general theory” can
be found in Badiani, Tiffany, and Ahmed’s commentaries.
“It is not new” is said in Kalivas and Gipson, Ahmed,
Tiffany and George and Koob’s commentaries.
(a) It is not true; this is not a general theory, because it
does not describe everything.
This is normal: a general theory only has to
provide a framework that can include everything.
By definition, a general theory conciliates, in a
single framework, different knowledge and theo-
ries in a given field. We agree that this is an
ambitious goal and when subjected to scholarly
criticism, formulating a general theory is almost
an impossible endeavor. However, general theories
have been previously established in other scientific
fields. Therefore, albeit difficult, such theories are
possible. However, one issue is important to clar-
ify. Attempting to describe all the knowledge of a
field in a single paper is destined to fail and is not
one of the requirements of a general theory. The
utility of general theories is not to discuss and
describe everything in a field; rather, they provide
a frame that is able to incorporate all relevant past
and future knowledge in that field. Consequently, a
general theory is not judged by the pieces that have
been omitted. Instead, one must evaluate whether
the omitted pieces can fit within the general
theory. If not, then the theory needs to be
revised or dropped.
Badiani, Tiffany, and Ahmed argue that
ours is not a general theory. However, with
the guidelines described above, none of their
comments provide evidences supporting their
claims and suggesting that our theory is false.
Badiani makes specific and fair examples
of what we have not included or exhaustively
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discussed. His first point is the lack of an
extensive discussion of potential differences
between the different drugs of abuse. This is
absolutely true. However, as mentioned earli-
er, what would endanger our general theory is
not the fact that we did not extensively de-
scribe all the drugs; rather, it is evidence
demonstrating that there are drugs of abuse
that cannot be incorporated in its frame. In
fact, Table 2 in our paper shows that the
Intensive Sustained Escalated use (ISuE) and
Loss of Control (LoC) phases can be identi-
fied for alcohol, cocaine, opioids, and canna-
bis. Clearly, drugs are different, but it is very
unlikely that there will be a drug for which
there will be no individual vulnerabilities and
less than three identifiable discrete steps in
the transition to addiction. However, if this
appears to be the case, then our theory should
be restrained only to the drugs for which it is
pertinent. The second point raised by Badiani
is that we did not include relapse and the
associated reinstatement model, which are cer-
tainly important aspects of addiction. Howev-
er, we did not forget relapse and reinstate-
ment, we purposely excluded them. Our the-
oretical piece, as stated in the title, concerns
exclusively “transition to addiction” and does
not encompass the entirety of the disease, and
in particular, its chronic aspects through re-
peated relapse. The main reason for this
choice is that we believe that there is still
not enough knowledge to determine if the
mechanisms responsible for transition to ad-
diction are similar or different from the one
that promote relapse. Definitely, ours is not a
“general theory of addiction” but only a “gen-
eral theory of the transition to it.” Finally and
legitimately, Badiani mentions that we did not
consider data and theories which support that
addiction is not a disease, but a matter of bad
choices (Heyman 2013). Clearly, this piece
was omitted and should not have been, but
we believe that it does not question our the-
ory. To consider that addiction is not a dis-
ease, but solely based on bad choices would
require one to defend that decision making
cannot be pathological. Currently, this view,
which almost considers human free will as a
non-neurobiological phenomenon, is quite iso-
lated. Many colleagues, including authors of
the present commentaries [e.g., (Kalivas and
Volkow 2005; Bechara 2005; Ahmed et al.
2013)…], who investigate and have shown
evidence for neurobiological bases of altered
decision making, will agree on this point.
Tiffany, in his opening statement, also ar-
gues that this is not a general theory of ad-
diction because our description “is not nearly
as comprehensive as promised” and that, in
particular, what is lacking is “a full consider-
ation of the human condition of addiction.”
However, Tiffany did not describe what we
are missing or not considering, and how this
would impair our theory. The rest of the
commentary is a criticism of some concepts
and implications contained in our theory, but
again, there is no description of the pieces of
the human condition of addiction that we are
missing. In this order, Tiffany comments on:
(1) The dimensional (Ti ffany) versus
categorial (us) vision of the different steps
of drug taking; (2) The correct definition of
a disease and generally, if behavioral pathol-
ogies are diseases; (3) The social implications
of considering addiction as a disease; and (4)
Loss of control versus decreased control on
drug intake in the LoC phase. Even the con-
cluding remark of the commentary stating “in
humans, the concept of control over drug use
is much more complicated, behaviorally and
biologically, than the caricature model by this
theory,” does not identify what is missing
from our theory. In conclusion, although Tif-
fany raises interesting points that we will
discuss in the third section of this reply, he
does not provide any explicit missing pieces
and does not show how they would invalidate
our theory.
In the commentary by Ahmed, we were
unable to understand the precise reasons why
Ahmed believes our theory is false. Initially,
Ahmed seems to say (second paragraph) that
it is not a general theory because it is a re-
description of data. However, he opens his
third paragraph by saying that this is not a
fatal flaw and that the same approach has
been successfully used in quantum mechanics
and genetics. We are unsure how to combine
these two opposing comments. In other
places, Ahmed’s criticisms seem to be that
we did not fully describe the methodology,
we did not prove that we are right, and we
did not prove that our theory is better than
others. These are surprising criticisms since
this is not an experimental paper in which
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the methodology has to be valid and the
statement of the authors must be proven by
results. Our paper is a “theory” based on
postulates and it is meant to provide predic-
tions. This is what should be proven right or
wrong by existing and future evidence. All
the evidence we provided clearly support our
theory. In contrast, Ahmed does not provide
any evidence that disproves it. Finally,
Ahmed says that we do not capture, using
his words, the behavioral “colonization” ob-
served during addiction because our model
does not contain behavioral alternatives. We
do not see how this impairs our theory, since
lowered sensitivity to alternative reinforcers is
a DSM criterion and is clearly acknowledged
in our paper. In addition, we clearly say that
current models of ISuE and LoC would cer-
tainly benefit from comparisons with models
including reinforcement alternatives to see if
these more complex procedures provide a
more complete model of human transition
to addiction.
(b) This general theory does not sound new: its ele-
ments have been published before.
This is normal as it is a general theory and not
a theory; its building blocks are previously pub-
lished ideas.
It is not new is certainly the major criticism in
four out of the five commentaries. George and
Koob discuss this at length in the “principle” sec-
tion of their commentary. Kalivas says this quite
clearly in his introductory paragraph. Ahmed
placed it in the title and Tiffany clearly says it in
his sixth paragraph.We believe that our colleagues
feel this way, because a general theory cannot
sound new.
(i) By definition the building blocks of a general theory
cannot be new
We probably have not fully explained the differences
between a theory and a general theory. A theory provides
a new vision that attempts to explain a given phenomenon
in opposition with previous or future theories. By defini-
tion, a theory must be new. In contrast, a general theory
creates an explanatory frame by incorporating existing
theories and knowledge to demonstrate that these previ-
ous findings were not a collection of opposing alterna-
tives but rather pieces of a complex puzzle. In a general
theory, the explanatory frame is new but the pieces
are not. As a consequence, if a general theory does
to not give a sense of “déjà vu” then it is probably
not a “general theory.”
(ii) Is our general theory not new?
How does one judge if a general theory is new? As
mentioned above, evaluating the novelty of its building
blocks cannot do this because, by definition, they cannot
be new. What has to be evaluated is the novelty of the
proposed frame and its ability to accommodate knowl-
edge of the field. More precisely, two questions should
be asked: (1) Has someone already provided such a
multi-step frame where specific vulnerabilities interact
with specific modalities of drug intake? And (2) is there
relevant knowledge in the field of addiction that cannot
be accommodated in the above described frame? None
of the criticisms in the five commentaries mention these
critical failures of a general theory. That is, none of the
commentaries identify another paper that has provided
an identical all-inclusive explanatory theoretical frame of
transition to addiction. And, none of the commentaries
identify known aspects of the addiction process that our
frame cannot accommodate. As such, we believe that the
goal of our paper to provide a new “general theory” to
the field of addiction still stands true.
(c) Individual vulnerability to addiction is an
ascertained fact.
Sometimes facts are forgotten.
The comments “everyone knows that” and “it
is an ascertained fact” were quite surprisingly said
by George and Koob about individual vulnerabil-
ity to transition to addiction. We would like to
provide a few comments to this statement. First,
we doubt that our colleagues can objectively deny
that over the last 25 years, we have actively
worked to convince the field that individual vul-
nerability to drug intake is an ascertained fact.
Second, we doubt that they can objectively ac-
knowledge that most of the field considers indi-
vidual vulnerability to addiction.
Here are some numbers. Currently a PubMed
search with “drug addiction” as the keyword gen-
erates 227,677 entries; if “individual vulnerabili-
ty” is added, it goes down to 1,619 articles. This
represents 0.7 % of the total papers on addiction
and is even lower if you search using “individual
difference” instead of “individual vulnerability.”
The mean number of articles per year using the
words “individual vulnerability” in their text was
close to 0 in the 1960s, 1.4 in the 1970s, and 6.9 in
the 1980s. After 1989 and up to 2003, it jumps to
41 and reaches a staggering 98 per year after 2004.
In the same period of time, the number of articles
per year found with the keywords “drug addic-
tion” goes from 1,000 to 2,500 in the 1960s and in
the 1970s, to 8,000 after 2004. Thus, articles on
drug addiction naming individual vulnerabilities
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reach a maximum of 1.23 % after 2004. As an
ascertained fact, research on individual vulnerabil-
ity in addiction has not received much attention.
One of the possible explanations is that in
previous theories of addiction [for example
(Wise 1987; Jentsch and Taylor 1999; Everitt
et al. 2001; Koob and Le Moal 2008a, b;
Robinson and Berridge 2008)] the role of individ-
ual differences has not been emphasized enough.
Our theory gives them a new, more integrated, and
crucial role, and shows how essential it is to take
them into account when studying addiction. Our
review even contains a methodological section
explaining how individual differences are an es-
sential tool to determine if a variable is “indepen-
dent” (involved in physiology) or “relevant” (a
true pathophysiological factor). It is true that we
did not discover individual vulnerabilities in this
theoretical paper. In this paper, as we do with the
rest of the current knowledge in the field, we put
them in what we believe is the right perspective to
highlight their crucial role.
B. What we could have done better
George and Koob’s and Badiani’s commentaries
provide criticisms that reveal two points of our
paper that need revision. Below, we discuss
them separately.
1. A better chapter on how to falsify our theory
George and Koob and Badiani criticize the
chapter where we describe how to falsify the
theory. We agree that this chapter could have
been written better.
Below, we propose some possible improve-
ments on the ideas contained in this chapter.
(a) How to improve the falsifiability of the first and
third prediction.
The first prediction states that “the transition to
addiction depends on an interaction between indi-
vidual vulnerability and drug exposure” and “var-
iation in the degree of these interactions cannot be
seen as a fundamental fallacy of the theory” and
that “one must prove that one of these two vari-
ables is not necessary to the development of path-
ological drug use”.
Badiani says that the first prediction cannot be
falsified because it is basically true; in our view,
this is a positive feature rather than a weakness of
our theory. In contrast, George and Koob say that
as stated in our paper, this prediction is not falsi-
fiable. They say that to falsify it, one should
demonstrate that addiction can occur in an
individual without drugs and those drugs can in-
duce addiction without an individual. The example
provided by George and Koob is quite extreme,
but it clearly suggests that some rewording is
needed.
The third prediction says that “The transition to
addiction is a true psychiatric disease” and that, to
falsify it, one must “demonstrate that in most
conditions drug, exposure is both necessary and
sufficient to induce addiction.”
Badiani states that the third prediction is basi-
cally the same thing as the first one. Indeed, both
predictions put forward the idea that individual
vulnerability and drug exposure are needed. The
two predictions then express the same postulate,
but examine it from opposite sides. George and
Koob say that the use of the words “most” in
the second prediction is too vague to make the
prediction falsifiable. They are right, the third pre-
diction needs rewording.
In order to address these criticisms we then
propose to unify the two predictions (first and
third) and reword the criteria to falsify them in
the following way:
Prediction: “the transition to addiction is a behavioral
pathology that depends on an interaction between indi-
vidual vulnerability and drug exposure.”
Falsification criteria: one must show that “in a condi-
tion of drug availability, which represents a significant
portion of the ones observed in humans, the number of
individuals, belonging to an outbred population, that do
not develop addiction is not significantly different from
the experimental error inherent in the procedure and the
measurement used to assess addiction. Conversely, in the
same conditions, the number of individuals that do de-
velop addiction must be significantly superior to the one
generated by the experimental error inherent in the pro-
cedure and the measurement used to assess addiction.”
The reason that formulating the condition to disprove
the prediction is complicated is because physiology and
pathology are not absolute states. Physiology and pathol-
ogy have developed during evolution as a selection pro-
cess to a given environment. Lungs are certainly a nec-
essary condition for life, except if we are underwater.
Similarly, we do not pretend to predict what would
happen under the conditions of planet Mars or in a group
of individuals that were continually tethered to an oper-
ating table and administered drugs three times a day. In
other words, our theory does not consider the ability
to induce the transition to addiction as an inherent
feature of a certain number of variables, but as an
emergent feature. As such, by definition, the effects
of these variables and their relationships among each
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other are dependent on context, as is the general
theory’s validity.
(b) How to improve the falsifiability of the second prediction
The second prediction states that “transition to addic-
tion is a process that needs at least three steps.” In other
words, our theory postulates that the development of
addiction is a transition between at least three different
identifiable stages and that in a given population of
individuals using drugs one should find individuals in
one stage or the other.
George and Koob say that this prediction cannot be
falsified since a transition is passing from one state to
another and unless we assume that the transition is im-
mediate, at least two steps are necessary to perform a
transition. For this reason, in their opinion, our theory
cannot be falsified. We do not understand this comment.
It would have been valid if we had said that there are at
least two steps from stages 1 to 2. However, we said at
least three, from regular drug use to excessive, and from
excessive to loss of control. Thus, the theory can be
falsified, if for example, someone can demonstrate that
transition to addiction is only a two-step process.
On the second prediction, Badiani says that we do not
provide any clear diagnostic criteria to identify the three
steps and so the theory is not falsifiable. We believe that
this is not true since the identifying features of the three
steps are described in page 6 of our review within the
“Transition to addiction in humans is a three-step pro-
cess” chapter. However, Badiani’s comment suggests
that in a revised version of the theory, a more extensive
description could be appropriate.
Badiani also says that we ignored the Dopamine
Dysregulation Syndrome (DDS) that produces an
accelerated shift to the LoC phase. We did not cite this
because it is an iatrogenic condition and as a
consequence, it is not immediately pertinent to
our theory. However, we should have cited and
discussed DDS; we will include DDS in a revised
version of the theory.
2. We should have said that this was just a general
theory and not the first one.
Badiani says that ours is not the first general
theory of transition to addiction because West and
Brown (2013) already did one. We were not aware
of the elegant work of West and Brown as a general
theory (West and Brown 2013). We believe that it is
a new theory altogether since they build their theo-
retical construct using the elementary components
found in other theories and do not use the theories
themselves. In other words, in West and Brown’s
book, previous theories are more atomized than
unified. In contrast, we admit that saying our gen-
eral theory was the first one was a mistake resulting
from unwarranted enthusiasm. In modern science
nothing is really said for the first time and if one
looks carefully remnants of that knowledge or opin-
ion can be found here and there in recent or past
history. As a consequence, in a revised version of
the theory “first” will disappear.
C. Reply to the specific criticisms of each commentary
1. Specific reply to Tiffany’s commentary: are we in the
same dimension?
Here we present our responses to Tiffany’s com-
ments that have not been addressed in the previous
section of our reply. Many of these comments are
interesting but we do not feel that they impair or
challenge the validity of our theory.
Tiffany says that “the idea that addiction is cate-
gorically distinct from non-addictive drug use stands
in contrast to the common assumption that addiction
is a dimensional construct with those engaged in very
heavy use only quantitatively and not qualitatively
different from less experienced users (Tiffany et al.
2004; Goedeker and Tiffany 2008). Here, Tiffany
raises a very interesting issue in the field of psychiatry
that is the unanswered question of the dimensional
versus categorial vision of psychiatric diseases. In
other words, is a disease simply the extreme overex-
pression of otherwise normal behaviors or is it a
different state from a normal condition? Tiffany clear-
ly promotes his dimensional vision that is well
respected, but also certainly not commonly accepted.
It is also a straw man argument to put our theory as
exclusively categorial. Quite the opposite, we believe
that the frame proposed by our theory is one of the
few theoretical constructs that allows for reconcilia-
tion of the dimensional/categorial debate. Thus, we
postulate that in the evolution of addiction, both di-
mensional and categorial changes exist. There is pri-
marily a dimensional evolution between recreational,
sporadic (ReS) to ISuE phases, i.e., more dopamine
and more drug intake, and principally, a categorial
one between ISuE and LoC. This idea is not only
based on behavioral features, i.e., a bimodal distribu-
tion in resistance to punishment that appear during the
LoC phase, but also on neurobiological evidence, i.e.,
the inability to recover a normal LTD in animals
showing addiction-like behavior. In conclusion, we
do acknowledge the dimensional nature of addiction
but we believe that it is most prominent during the
ISuE phase but not during the entire process of tran-
sition to addiction.
Tiffany also contests the idea that our theory dem-
onstrates that “addiction is a true psychiatric disease.”
In this paragraph, he contests the existence of
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psychiatric diseases in general. He says that there is
no consensus of the definition of what a psychiatric
disease is and that depression and anxiety disorders
are not established as psychiatric diseases. Tiffany
suggests Jellineck’s assertion that a “Disease is what
the medical profession considers as such” as the best
definition of a psychiatric disease. However, follow-
ing his reasoning, one has to conclude that: (1) de-
pression and anxiety disorders are diseases since the
medical profession considers them as such, and (2)
since addiction shares features with anxiety and de-
pression, addiction is also a psychiatric disease. In
conclusion, we agree with Tiffany that to date, there is
not a general theoretical definition of psychiatric dis-
ease. In a revised version of the theory, we will state
this clearly and add that we believe that addiction is a
psychiatric disease no more and no less than depres-
sion and anxiety disorders.
Tiffany also criticizes the idea that accepting ad-
diction as a psychiatric disease would humanize treat-
ment of addiction, because psychiatric diseases are
stigmatizing. This is probably one of the most pecu-
liar statements of Tiffany’s commentary. It is true that
all diseases, even non-psychiatric ones, are stigmatiz-
ing to a certain degree. However, a non-disease alter-
native for addiction would be to view it as a vice.
Vices are overtly stigmatized by our societies and the
proper response to them is considered punishment
and not treatment. Thus, progressing from a view in
which the addict is a vicious individual that should be
punished to a view in which the addict is a person
with a disease that needs treatment seems to be a
favorable evolution to us. In addition, in the progres-
sion of our society from sectarian to nonpartisan
beliefs, we believe that diseases will be rehabilitated
much more quickly than vices.
Finally, Tiffany criticizes our theory by saying that
in the final stage of addiction, there is not “loss of
control” of drug intake but “less control” of drug
intake. Is this a lethal blow of our theory? We do
not believe so. In fact what we say is that in the final
stage, the control of drug intake is low enough for
drug taking to become the dominant behavior. Does
the fact, put forward by Tiffany, that addicts can, in
experimental conditions, decrease drug intake when
given an alternative reward invalidate our vision of
loss of control? We do not believe so; otherwise, we
would have learned to treat addiction with choc-
olate or money a long time ago and solved this
major problem in our society using this simple
and efficient strategy.
In conclusion, we thank Dr. Tiffany for his
interesting comments; they have given us the
opportunity to discuss important issues in the field
of behavioral pathologies. However, none of them
actually impairs the validity of our theory.
2. Specific Reply to Kalivas and Gipson’s commentary:
looking for the lost “lost opportunity.”
We have read and re-read the elegant commentary
by Kalivas and Gipson and being influenced by the
title “Mourning a Lost Opportunity,” we have
searched for this fatal flaw, for the opportunity we
missed. However, except for the statements saying
that what we describe is not really new (of which we
discussed in the first section of our reply) we have not
found a single criticism to any of the principles or
predictions of our theory. Thus, the lost opportunity is
not to be found in the fact that we did not provide a
“general theory of transition to addiction.”
Starting with their second paragraph, Kalivas and
Gipson provide an interesting comment on the danger
of anthropomorphism and the use of experimental
models. Kalivas and Gipson have broadly interpreted
the word anthropomorphism to a degree that also
includes behavioral face validity models. Since we
have been promotingmodels of transition to addiction
based on face validity, maybe the lost opportunity is
here; we are anthropomorphist. Anthropomorphism
consists of attributing human characteristics to real or
imaginary beings that are not humans. Then, it is true
that behavioral face validity models are quite anthro-
pomorphic in nature but so is practically 80 % of the
research in neurobiology. The simple sentence used
by Kalivas and Gipson that research in animals “al-
lows understanding how the brain works” is, for
example, extremely anthropomorphist. This phrase
implies that we can understand the brain of humans
by studying the brains of animals; thus, we are attrib-
uting human features to the brain of a rodent despite
the fact that they are quite different in shape and size.
In other words, anthropomorphist is nearly insepara-
ble from neurobiologist.
However, it is true that anthropomorphism should
be controlled and limited. And we agree with Kalivas
and Gipson that attributing human feelings to animals
is clearly crossing a line. Thus, it is probably here
where the lost opportunity can be found: we are
attributing feelings to animals. Unfortunately, this is
absolutely not the case. When we talk about mourn-
ing, need, pleasure, and desire, we do not talk about
animals but about humans. We are not proposing a
general theory of transition to addiction in rats or
mice; our general theory is for humans in which,
pleasure, desire, need, and mourning are appropriate
descriptions of internal states. In addition, these terms
are not derived from the behavior we see in animals
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but from the neurobiological changes that characterize
each step of the transition to addiction. Starting from
these changes, we have tried to conceptualize how
these changes in brain activity could be felt by humans.
In conclusion, we believe that based on current neuro-
biological knowledge “pleasure, desire, need, and
mourning” are appropriate descriptions of the state that
accompany transition to addiction in humans.
Finally, Kalivas andGipson criticize the fact that we
have proposed the escalation model as a model of the
transition from the ReS to the ISuE phase. Is the lost
opportunity the one of getting rid of the escalation
model? On this point, we believe that the commentary
by George and Koob, a eulogy of the escalation
model, is the most appropriate response to
Kalivas and Gipson criticisms.
In conclusion, Kalivas and Gipson’s commentary
provided a stimulating discussion of some important
issues in neurobiological research in general. However,
it fell short in showing us which opportunity we lost.
3. Specific reply to Ahmed’s commentary: a lot of heat
and little light
We read with interest the personal commentary of
our neighbor and colleague, Ahmed. We have ad-
dressed above some of his comments and we of
course disagree with him that our HR/LR model
retarded progress in the addiction field. His comments
did not provide any insight about our general theory
other than to say that it is not a general theory and that
results from choice-based models should be incorpo-
rated in current addiction models. As discussed
above, we disagree with the former statement and as
already mentioned in our paper we agree with the
latter statement.
4. Specific replay to George and Koob’s commentary
In the quite extensive part of their comments,
George and Koob do not basically criticize the fun-
damentals of our theory but say that we have not
given enough emphasis on various aspects of the
transition process.
(a) Embracing hedonic state but discarding withdrawal.
In our theory, we do not say that withdrawal
should be discarded because it is irrelevant to ad-
diction, but because we believe that studying it
presents a risk. Thus, withdrawal is not a necessary
or sufficient condition in the transition to addiction.
Several pharmacological compounds that produce
serious physical and emotional withdrawal do not
induce addiction and for many drugs of abuse,
withdrawal is not a clear-cut event. Consequently,
we prefer to be on a safer ground and study phe-
nomena that more closely relate to addiction.
However, adding physical and/or emotional with-
drawal as an additional process that contributes to
the transition to addiction does not constitute a
problem for our theory as it can easily embrace it
as a contributor factor of excessive drug intake.
We also believe that a number of sentences by
George and Koob do not really help the cause of
withdrawal. For example, “it is important to realize
that the diagnostic criteria in the DSM IVor DSMV
are not relevant to the understanding of the mecha-
nisms that underlie the progression of the disease”
or “the National institutes of Health no longer funds
projects that rely exclusively on the DSM” and
“motivational withdrawal and mourning are the
same thing.” How is it possible that the criteria that
allows for the identification of individuals, whose
pathophysiological condition we strive to under-
stand, can be ignored when studying such a patho-
logical process? And we and numerous other re-
searchers in the USA and Europe strongly disagree
with the notion that NIH funding strategy reflects an
ultimate scientific truth? Thirty years ago, NIDA
did not fund research on the influence of individual
differences, role of stress in drug use, and relapse,
because they were considered irrelevant in the very
strong drug-centered approach of the time. Finally,
by which process can a decrease in positive moti-
vation be assimilated to the discomfort gener-
ated by the inability to replace a behavior that
has become crystallized?
(b) “What happened to the brain stress systems” and a
“somewhat myopic vision of the biological basis
of loss of control”
We clearly stated in our paper that it is not an
exhaustive review of the neurobiological changes
induced by exposure to drugs and/or influencing
drug taking. The main focus is to provide a general
theory of transition to addiction and not to compile
the many neurobiological correlates of drug effects
and drug taking. Consequently, exhaustively citing
everyone was not the mission of our review. Con-
scious of this, we apologized in the paper to the
colleagues who may feel that their work was not
sufficiently cited. Clearly, this apology needs to be
reworded and made clearer in a revised version of
the theory and wewould like to renew this apology
to George and Koob that clearly resent that their
work was not sufficiently cited. We did not cite
their work out of disrespect, but simply because
either we did not needmore data to prove our point
or because those data would not help to prove that
point. As we have explained at length, to go from
physiology to pathophysiology one has to move
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from the study of independent variables to the
study of relevant ones. This approach is explained
at length in our paper. Unfortunately, for many of
the variables contained in the hundreds of papers
we have not cited, it is unclear if they are indepen-
dent or relevant variables. We have no doubt that
this incertitude will be clarified in the future.
(c) Classification of the model of escalation of drug
intake as an animal model that precedes the tran-
sition to loss of control.
We believe that this comment of George and
Koob arises from a misunderstanding. As we have
said, a step toward loss of control is an escalation
in drug intake and maintaining a sustained level of
drug consumption for a considerable amount of
time. Clearly, after a while, in the population that
escalates drug intake, there will be individuals that
will develop loss of control. Thinking otherwise
would be in contradiction with our own theory.
The reason why we have proposed the escalation
model as a model of the ISuE phase is because this
is the way in which it is currently used, i.e., the
only phenotype that the model requires to be mea-
sured is the amount of drug taken. In order to
extend the model from the ISuE to the LoC phase,
George and Koob should introduce in the escala-
tion model parameters that actually measure LoC
and that allows identification of the animals,
among the ones that have escalated drug intake,
that have developed loss of control.
We would also like to point out that proposing
the escalation model as a model of the ISuE phase
we have taken a theoretical stand that is in favor of
the author’s works and of the Bordeaux School of
Psychobiology that has largely contributed to this
model. However, this position is not shared by all
leaders in the field. See, for example, the commen-
tary by Kalivas that criticizes our theory because
we have included the escalation model. It is, in
fact, true that escalation is not a necessary or
sufficient condition to shift to loss of control and
in our own experience giving the animal’s longer
access to drugs and making them escalate does not
increase the final number of animals that shift into
the LoC phase. However, escalation of drug intake
is the very definition of going from recreational to
sustained drug use. Consequently, we do not see
how it can be kept out from any complete model-
ing of transition to addiction.
Finally, it is kind of puzzling to be criticized by
these colleagues for stating that we have produced
the “best” model to date of one single step of
transition to addiction (i.e., the LoC phase) while
they provide a strong eulogy of their escalation
model, which, in their opinion, encompasses the
entire transition to addiction process.
(d) Percentage of vulnerable individuals
We believe that this very elegant part of George
and Koob’s commentary is also the result of a
misunderstanding. In fact, this issue was fully
addressed in the online supporting materials of
our 2004 Science paper. As shown in the paper,
changing the cut off value did not change signifi-
cantly the magnitude of the number of individuals
with three positive criteria. The 20% range is not a
calculation artifact but a biological reality found in
rats as well in humans.
5. Specific reply to Badiani’s comment: DSM is not an
umbrella but a trampoline.
We have been impressed by Badiani’s scholarly
comments. Nevertheless, the section “Defining of
Addiction,” using Badiani’s words, is “less good
than the rest.”
Badiani starts by saying that despite our best
efforts, we give a circular definition of addiction
because we use the DSM criteria for depen-
dence. More accurately, what we say is that we
define addiction as the collection of behaviors
that are used to identify patients suffering from
drug dependence in the DSM IV and substance
abuse disorders (SUD) in the DSM V. We do
not believe this argument is circular. What we
provide is a very simple and basic operational
definition that is no more circular than saying
that a reinforcer is a stimulus that increases the
probability of the appearance of a behavior.
Similarly, we say that addiction is a condition
that increases the probability of a certain number
of behaviors to appear. What could be argued is
that ours is not an absolute definition of addic-
tion but a relative, medically oriented one, de-
rived from the patients and not from an a priori
theoretical construct. This is certainly the case
and we believe, as argued in our paper, that it is
the best approach if the goal of the research is
to understand a disease.
Badiani then says that when we use and
discuss the DSM, we enter in dangerous termi-
nological waters. We agree on the danger but we
do not see when and where our ship sunk. Thus,
we are quite precise in our comparison of the
DSM IV and V, taking in to account, among
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others, all the points raised by Badiani. Impor-
tantly, we included the fact that because of the
inclusion of “craving items” in DSM V, it is
theoretically possible to make a diagnosis of
severe SUD in the DSM V without any of the
items of dependence from DSM IV (Table 1).
However, we also show in Table 2 (not cited by
Badiani) that this does not happen in reality.
Thus, across several drugs, diagnosis of drug
abuse in the DSM IV corresponds to 99 % of
cases of diagnosed mild or moderate SUD (in-
ferior to severe) with the DSM V. Similarly, a
diagnosis of drug dependence with the DSM IV
corresponds across most drugs in 85–93 % of
cases to a diagnosis of severe SUD with the DSM V,
except for cannabis, where it is 67 %. Finally, we do
not use the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) ap-
proach as a source of diagnostic criteria but try to see
what clinical endpoints putative RDoC dimensions of
addiction would produce. Based on this analysis, we
argue that transition to addiction is a three-step process
and that the different degrees of severity of the DSMV
reflect different behavioral alterations mediated by
different mechanisms and vulnerabilities. We do not
use the DSM as a protective umbrella, as Badiani
noted, but as an analytical starting point to develop
our own theoretical construct.
Finally, there is also a mistake in Badiani’s com-
mentary when he says that we turned the DSM V
rationale on its head by suggesting that abuse and
dependence are “conceptually different categories
reflecting a different realm of problematic use.” We
do not suggest this; rather, we discussed what the
justification was in the DSM IV for proposing the
two categories.
D. Conclusions: if farewell is premature then greetings
Badiani says that the farewell at the end of our paper is
premature. Our response is that if farewell at the end of a
paper is surprisingly not appropriate, we hope that
all the authors of these commentaries would at least
accept our greetings.
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